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Abstract
How do the statements made by people in online political discussions affect other people's willingness to
express their own opinions, or argue for them? And how does group interaction ultimately shape
individual opinions? We examine carefully whether and how patterns of group discussion shape (a)
individuals' expressive behavior within those discussions and (b) changes in personal opinions. This
research proposes that the argumentative "climate" of group opinion indeed affects postdiscussion
opinions, and that a primary mechanism responsible for this effect is an intermediate influence on
individual participants' own expressions during the online discussions. We find support for these
propositions in data from a series of 60 online group discussions, involving ordinary citizens, about the
tax plans offered by rival U.S. presidential candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore in 2000.
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How do the statements made by people in online political discussions affect other peo
ple’s willingness to express their own opinions, or argue for them? And how does group
interaction ultimately shape individual opinions? We examine carefully whether and
how patterns of group discussion shape (a) individuals’ expressive behavior within those
discussions and (b) changes in personal opinions. This research proposes that the argu
mentative ‘‘climate’’ of group opinion indeed affects postdiscussion opinions, and that
a primary mechanism responsible for this effect is an intermediate influence on individ
ual participants’ own expressions during the online discussions. We find support for
these propositions in data from a series of 60 online group discussions, involving ordi
nary citizens, about the tax plans offered by rival U.S. presidential candidates George
W. Bush and Al Gore in 2000.

Investigations of social influence and public opinion go hand in hand. Opinions may
exist as psychological phenomena in individual minds, but the processes that shape
these opinions—at least, public opinions—are inherently social–psychological. The
notion that group interaction can influence individual opinions is widely accepted.
Indeed, according to many participatory theories of democracy, lively exchanges
among citizens are deemed central to the formation of sound or ‘‘true’’ public
opinion, which is forged in the fire of group discussion. This truly public opinion
is commonly contrasted with mass or ‘‘pseudo’’-opinion developed in isolation by
disconnected media consumers responding individually to the news (e.g., Blumer,
1946; Fishkin, 1991, 1995; Graber, 1982).
Although discussion is celebrated in democratic theory as a critical element of
proper opinion formation, it also brings with it a variety of potential downsides. These
include a possible tyranny of the majority (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1835/1945), distorted
expression of opinions resulting from fear of social isolation (Noelle-Neumann, 1984),
or shifts of opinion to more extreme positions than most individuals might actually
prefer (see, e.g., Janis, 1972, on dangerous forms of ‘‘group think,’’ or more recently

Sunstein, 2001, on the polarizing effects of ‘‘enclave’’ communication on the Web). The
problem of how to foster productive social interaction while avoiding potential dysfunctions of group influence has occupied a large place in normative writings on public
opinion and democracy. Modern democracies guarantee freedom of association and
public expression; they also employ systems and procedures aimed at protecting
collective decision making from untoward social pressure, including not only the
use of secret ballots in elections but also more generally republican legislatures and
executive and judicial offices that by design are insulated from too much democracy,
that is, from direct popular control (e.g., Madison, 1788/1966). However, steady advances in popular education and growth of communication media have enlarged
expectations of the ordinary citizen and brought calls for more direct, popular participation in government. In particular, dramatic technological changes over the past
several decades—and especially the rise of interactive forms of electronic communication enabled by the Internet and World Wide Web—have fueled hopes for new,
expansive, and energized forms of ‘‘teledemocracy’’ (e.g., Arterton, 1987).
Online political discussion is thus of considerable interest to students of public
opinion and political communication. It has been credited with creating vital
spaces for public conversation, opening in a new ‘‘public sphere’’ of the sort
envisioned by Habermas (1962/1989), (see, e.g., Papacharissi, 2004; Poor, 2005;
Poster, 1997). Though still not a routine experience for citizens, it has been steadily
growing in prevalence and likely import for popular opinion formation. Recent
surveys indicate that close to a third of Internet users regularly engage with groups
online, with nearly 10% reporting that they joined online discussions about the
2004 presidential election (Pew Research Center, 2005). Online political discussion
offers new and potentially quite powerful modes of scientific observation as well.
Despite continuous methodological improvements, the mainstay of public opinion
research, the general-population survey, has always consisted of randomly sampled,
one-on-one, respondent-to-interviewer ‘‘conversations’’ aimed at extracting precoded responses or short verbal answers to structured questionnaires. Web-based
technologies, however, may now permit randomly constituted respondent-withrespondent group conversations. The conceptual fit between such conversations
and the phenomenon of public opinion, itself grounded in popular discussion,
renders it quite appealing. Developments in electronic data storage and retrieval,
and telecommunication networks of increasing channel capacity, now make possible an integration of general-population survey techniques and more qualitative
research approaches, such as focus group methods, that have become popular in
large part owing to the sense that they offer a more refined understanding of
popular thought than might be gained from structured surveys (e.g., Morgan,
1997). Perhaps most important, the study of online discussion opens new theoretical avenues for public opinion research. Understanding online citizen interactions
calls for bringing together several strands of theory in social psychology, smallgroup decision making, and political communication that have heretofore been
disconnected (Price, 1992).

Social influence in opinion formation
Certainly, the most prominent theory of social influence in public opinion research
has been Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) spiral of silence. Citing early research on group
conformity processes, such as that of Asch (1956), Noelle-Neumann argued that
media depictions of the normative ‘‘climate of opinion’’ have a silencing effect on
those who hold minority viewpoints. The reticence of minorities to express their
views contributes to the appearance of a solid majority opinion, which, in turn,
produces a spiral of silence that successively emboldens the majority and enervates
the minority. Meta-analytic evaluations of research on the hypothetical silencing
effect of the mediated climate of opinion suggest that such effects, if they indeed
exist, appear to be fairly small (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997); nevertheless, the
theory has garnered considerable empirical attention and remains influential.
In experimental social psychology, group influence has been the object of systematic study for over half a century. Although no single theoretical framework is
available for explaining how social influence operates, some important organizing
principles and concepts have emerged over time (Price & Oshagan, 1995). One of the
most useful heuristics, proposed by Deutsch and Gerard (1955), distinguishes two
broad forms of social influence (see also Kaplan & Miller, 1987). Normative social
influence occurs when someone is motivated by a desire to conform to the positive
expectations of other people. Motivations for meeting these normative expectations
lie in the various rewards that might accrue (self-esteem or feelings of social
approval) or possible negative sanctions that might result from deviant behavior
(alienation, excommunication, or social isolation). Normative social influence is
clearly the basis of Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) theorizing about minorities silencing
themselves in the face of majority pressure. Informational social influence, in contrast, occurs when people accept the words, opinions, and deeds of others as valid
evidence about reality. People learn about the world, in part, from discovering that
they disagree (e.g., Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). They
are influenced by groups not only because of group norms, but also because of
arguments that arise in groups, through a comparison of their views to those
expressed by others (see also the distinction between normative and comparative
functions of reference groups in sociology, e.g., Hyman & Singer, 1968; Kelley, 1952).
Although the distinction between informational and normative influence has
proven useful and historically important in small-group research, it can become
cloudy in many instances. This is so because normative pressure and persuasive
information operate in similar ways within groups, and often with similar effects.
For example, the tendency of groups to polarize—that is, to move following discussion to extreme positions in the direction that group members were initially
inclined—can result either from adjustments to a perceived normative position of
the group or from limited or biased pool of group arguments. It can also be difficult
in practice to separate the informational content of persuasive messages from the
normative pressure they may bring to bear, in other words, to separate the normative
function of comments made within a group (i.e., conveyance of a group’s overall

preference) from the informative functions served by those same comments
(Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005, pp. 29–30; Turner, 1991, pp. 144–147). Turner
(1982) argued for a third approach to group influence—one he labeled referent
informational influence—which he saw as something of an amalgam of Deutsch
and Gerard’s (1955) informational influence and notions of reference-group power
to shape behavior (e.g., French & Raven, 1959; Kelman, 1961). Turner’s explanation
centered on basic cognitive, self-categorization processes, following Tajfel (1978). He
argued that, when people categorize themselves and others as belonging to distinctive
groups (even broad social categories), they will tend to impute the perceived stereotypical characteristics of their own group to themselves. Unlike normative or informational influence as conventionally described, this form of influence stems not only
(or not even) from normative or argumentative pressures brought by other group
members but rather from one’s own beliefs about the appropriate behavior of people
belonging to whatever social category is used at the moment to define oneself
(Turner, 1982, 1991). This form of influence is in essence a ‘‘self-stereotyping’’
process, involving internalized norms rather than external pressures. It is fully consistent with long-standing evidence that merely increasing the situational salience of
group membership leads people to express more normative group opinions and
attitudes, even in the absence of any direct social influence from others (e.g., Charters
& Newcomb, 1952; Doise, 1969; Kelley, 1955; also reconfirmed by recent evidence
that anonymous encounters online can exert normative group influence, e.g., Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998).
The Turner and Tajfel cognitive redefinition of social group influence, under the
rubric of social identity theory, has met with substantial empirical support and
informed large bodies of scholarship in social psychology, particularly so in the study
of intergroup behavior, stereotyping, prejudice, and minority group relations (see,
e.g., reviews in Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Given
that the theory explains how people can be socially influenced even without direct
interpersonal contact, it has been studied primarily in connection with ‘‘minimal,’’
noninteracting groups or in relation to large-scale intergroup processes (where
group categories are constructed experimentally or where preexisting group differences are made salient).1 More recently, however, research has begun to apply social
identity theory in the analysis of small-group interaction as well, particularly with
respect to identity formation in computer-mediated communication (e.g., Postmes
et al., 1998). Noting that the bulk of research to date has focused on the effects of
making salient some existing or externally imposed group identity (what Turner,
1982 called the deductive aspect of referent informational influence), Postmes and
colleagues (Postmes et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, in press) point out
that relatively few studies have explored what Turner termed the inductive aspect: the
‘‘means by which the criterial attributes of some [group] category are inferred from
one or more individual members’’ (1982, p. 28). Harkening back to Sherif’s (1935)
early work on norm formation through group interaction, Postmes and colleagues
have begun to explore not only the ‘‘top-down’’ means by which group norms

influence members, but also the ‘‘bottom-up’’ means by which members actively
construct their own group norms. Postmes, Spears, and Lea (2000), for example,
monitored e-mail exchanged by 87 students enrolled in an online statistics course
over 4 months. They identified 11 groups of students who regularly exchanged
messages to each other, and examined patterns in messaging over time. Evidence
of norm formation was found in terms of distinctive within-group message profiles
based on features such as message categories, requests, complaints, humor, expression of emotion, flaming, and message length. Moreover, the data suggested that
group members tended overtime to produce messages that were increasingly prototypical of the group norms, which the authors interpreted as evidence of normative influence.
Tracking the routes of influence
The mechanisms by which normative or informational influence might flow among
members of a group discussing politics online, then, are myriad. Some theorists (e.g.,
Noelle-Neumann, 1984) heavily emphasize normative pressures to conform; others
emphasize the role of argumentation (e.g., Sunstein, 2001, in his examination of
‘‘informational cascades’’ as a source of group polarization). Many outcomes, for
example apparent conformity to a group majority, may stem from either normative
or informational influences, or some amalgam (Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955;
Turner, 1991). As predicted by conformity theories, the dominant sense of feeling of
a group (the opinion climate) might cause its separate members to misrepresent
their private views, either by refraining from expressing them or by adapting them to
the majority opinion. This process may occur and still not produce individual
changes of opinion. Indeed, studies of small-group influence indicate that conformity processes often produce mere compliance rather than internal conversions of
opinion (Kelman, 1961; Moscovici, 1985). The particular arguments expressed, on
the other hand, might produce internal conversions of opinion even without
extracting much behavioral conformity. That is, a group might generally agree on
a particular issue and yet, in their discussions of it, uncover a range of both pro- and
con-arguments. These may, over the course of time, lead to movements of group
members to adopt new viewpoints, particularly if their initial opinions were not very
well formed. Finally, as predicted by social identity theory, group members might
conform their behavior to their perception of a prototypical group member, not out
of any majority pressure or because they are persuaded by the substance of the
arguments, but rather because they are enacting their understood roles as group
members. The perceived group norms to which members conform could be preexisting, and brought into the group from the outside, or built up inductively through
behavioral exchanges within the group.
Examining these sorts of interactive processes requires more than just input/
output measures of how group members feel about an issue before and after discussion. Also needed are detailed assessments of what each person actually says in
discussion, including both expressions of preference and arguments that are raised.

Data that closely track group interaction were usually not gathered in early social–
psychological experiments. Rather, such experiments measured inputs to and outputs from group interaction, without close examination of actual processes of group
discussion. And, oddly enough, many studies of group influence did not actually
examine groups communicating in any ordinary sense; instead, they involved rounds
of decision-making tasks, for example, perceptual judgments of line lengths or slides
that are shared within the group (often constituted of experimental confederates in
order to create opinion majorities or minorities, see Moscovici, 1985, for a review).
As noted earlier, recent research has begun to track patterns of group interaction.
However, the focus of such interaction analysis has not been of the kind that illuminates the opinion formation and change processes of interest to political communication or public opinion researchers. The Postmes et al. (2000) study of online
communication discussed above, for instance, coded features such as self-reference,
requests, complaints, flaming, use of humor or slang, and the like. Research in formal
decision-making groups has studied patterns of argumentation in some detail, both
in face-to-face settings (e.g., Meyers, 1989) and in computer-mediated groups (e.g.,
Brashers, Adkins, & Meyers, 1994). These studies, however, have focused on group
outcomes rather than on individual choices, finding evidence that group decisions
are influenced both by the total proportion of arguments made supporting or
opposing the proposition and by the number of group members offering support
or opposition (Gouran, 1994; Hoffman, 1979; Lemus, Siebold, Flanagin, & Metzger,
2004; McPhee, Poole, & Siebold, 1982; Meyers & Brashers, 1998). The burgeoning
array of studies into Group Decision Support Systems has thus made significant
advances in tracing patterns of argumentation in groups; but the applicability of this
work to online political discussion, where people are under no expectation of arriving at a group decision or shared judgment, remains open to question. Moreover,
these studies have not typically examined the role of group arguments or normative
pressure in shaping individual participants’ expression or concealment of their
own private opinions, or traced this behavior to subsequent individual opinion
formation—processes of primary interest to public opinion researchers (Glynn
et al., 1997).
Research questions and hypotheses
The present study focused on the influence of groups on individuals in settings where
they engaged in political discussion without any explicit expectation of coming to
a shared judgment. We took advantage of a unique data set to explore the processes—
both normative and informational—through which group influences might operate.
Specifically, we examined a series of 60 online group discussions that occurred in
2000, involving ordinary citizens, about the tax plans offered by rival presidential
candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore. These discussions, described below, were
broadly deliberative in nature but did not lead to any common group judgment.
Neither votes were taken nor were participants urged to arrive at a consensus. We
recorded all of the group interactions and classified all statements made by

participants into either (a) mere expressions of preference or opinion, and (b)
reasons or arguments in support of particular points of view. Mere expressions of
opinion, while they can clearly create a normative climate of group opinion, should
not contribute to opinion formation through any rational, argumentative mechanism. Arguments, on the other hand, should constitute a fund of potential informational value to participants.
Both traditional conformity approaches to social influence and more recent
social identity approaches would predict that the people’s arguments and expressions
of opinion during online discussions should be affected by the tenor of group
argumentation, such that:
H1a: People are likely to express views favorable to candidate Bush when in groups
where others express support for Bush; conversely, people will tend to express
support for Gore when in groups where others support Gore.
H1b: People are likely to make arguments for Bush’s tax plan (and against Gore’s plan)
when in groups where others argue for Bush; conversely, people will tend to make
arguments for Gore’s plan (and against Bush’s plan) when in groups where others
argue for Gore.

The exchange of viewpoints is also expected to shape individual participants’
opinions:
H2: People are likely to report opinions, postdiscussion, supporting Bush’s tax plan
when others in their group supported Bush; conversely, people will tend to support
Gore’s plan, postdiscussion, when others in their group supported Gore.

Research has suggested that computer-meditated groups, relative to face-to-face
interactions, produce less individual dominance (Walther, 1995), greater equality of
member participation (Siegal, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986), and at least in
formal decision-making settings, a greater number of unique ideas (Dennis, 1996;
Gallupe, DeSantis, & Dickson, 1998). Research findings on the comparative impact
of computer-mediated communication on argument generation are somewhat sparse
and mixed to date. However, we have cause to expect that computer mediation should
facilitate disagreement in a political context (Stromer-Galley, 2003) and, in part
because the exchanges focus entirely on textual messages (e.g., Rice, 1993), we expect
that in the present context, arguments should prove especially influential:
H3a: Individual’s arguments and expressions of opinion will be more greatly influenced
by arguments made by others in the group than by mere expressions of opinion
among members of the group.
H3b: People’s postdiscussion opinions will be more greatly influenced by others’
arguments than by others’ mere expressions of opinion.

Finally, we expect that the particular arguments and expressed viewpoints proving most influential on postdiscussion opinions would be each participant’s own

expressions. This is predicted in part on account of the higher salience of one’s own
statements, but also due to self-persuasion and self-attribution processes (Bem,
1970). Expressive behavior is a step in the process of self-definition and opinion
change, a form of ‘‘test’’ behavior that helps a person along toward a well-formed
judgment (Kelman, 1974; Price, 1992). This prediction is also consistent with social
identity theory, in that it posits people induce the prototypical features of a group
member from others’ behavior, and then conform their own behavior to perceived
group norms. We thus hypothesize
H4: The influence of others’ arguments and viewpoints on an individual’s
postdiscussion opinions concerning the candidates’ tax plans will be mediated by the
arguments and views that individual personally expresses during the discussion.

We carefully examined these hypotheses, inquiring as to whether and how mere
opinion statements and arguments shaped both (a) individuals’ expressive behavior
in the discussions and (b) changes in personal opinions. Our results suggested that
the argumentative ‘‘climate’’ of group opinion indeed affected postdiscussion
opinions. Importantly, a primary mechanism responsible for this effect appears to
have been an intermediate influence on individual participants’ own expressions
during the online deliberations.
Method

Data came from the Electronic Dialogue project, a yearlong panel project conducted
during the 2000 U.S. presidential election. The project involved a multiwave, multigroup panel design, carried out for a period of 1 year. All data gathering was
conducted via the World Wide Web. The core of project consisted of sixty groups
of citizens who engaged in a series of monthly, real-time electronic discussions about
issues facing the country and the unfolding presidential campaign.
The project did not rely upon a convenience sample of Internet users, as is
common in Web-based studies. Respondents instead came from a random sample
of American citizens aged 18 and older drawn from a nationally representative
panel of survey respondents maintained by Knowledge Networks, Inc., in Menlo
Park, California. The Knowledge Networks panel includes a large number of households (in the tens of thousands) selected through random digit dialing (RDD) and
who have agreed to accept free WebTV equipment and service in exchange for
completing periodic surveys online. Details of the sampling are presented in the
Appendix.
A set of baseline surveys in February and March 2000 (N 1684) yielded information concerning participants’ opinions, communicative behavior, knowledge of
public affairs and of the presidential candidates, and a variety of demographic,
personality, and background variables. Respondents were randomly assigned to
one of three groups. Those in the discussion group (n 915) were invited to attend
eight online group deliberations, once a month on average, beginning in April

and continuing through December. Topics of discussion included which issues
respondents thought were of importance to the country and ought to be the focus
of attention in the campaign, specific issues and policy proposals (e.g., in areas of
education, crime and public safety, taxes, and foreign affairs), characteristics of the
candidates, campaign advertising, and the role of the media. Members invited to the
discussion groups, regardless of whether they attended or not, were also asked to
complete a series of surveys, one preceding and one following each discussion event.
Participants assigned to the survey-only control group (n 139) were likewise asked
to complete all the surveys, although they were not invited to attend any online
discussions. The remainder of the participants were assigned to a project pre/post-only
condition: They were asked to complete only the baseline surveys and, 1 year later,
the final end-of-project surveys. All three groups of project participants received
these end-of-project surveys, conducted in January and February 2001. Details of
the design are presented in the Appendix.
Sample

The present analysis involved only on the sixth discussion event, held from October 7
through October 17, 2000, when participants debated, among other topics, the tax
proposals of rival candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore. The section dealing with
tax proposals ran roughly 12 minutes and followed a standard prompt issued by the
online moderators. The prompt was:
Another issue under discussion this election season is taxes. Some argue that the
national budget surplus should be used to cut taxes. Others argue that the surplus
should be used to cut the deficit or pay for other government programs. What do you
think should be done?

Just over one third of eligible participants assigned to the discussion group (34%)
attended the October discussion event (n 306). These participants were the focus of
our analysis. The vast majority of them (90%) completed the preevent survey, fielded
between September 22 and October 2, and 87% completed the postevent survey,
fielded immediately following discussions, from October 7 through October 18. Just
over 80% (n 247) completed both pre- and postsurveys.3
Measures
Opinions about the tax proposals
Prediscussion opinion. In a section of the preevent questionnaire concerning the
candidates’ tax proposals, respondents were asked, ‘‘Which of the two plans do
you think you would prefer, if you had to choose?’’ Responses were Bush’s plan,
Gore’s plan, or ‘‘don’t know.’’ Of the 247 survey respondents included in the analysis,
a majority chose Bush’s plan (48%), followed by 31% who chose Gore’s, and about
21% who did not know.

Postdiscussion opinion. Each respondent indicated on the postdiscussion survey
whether he or she was favorable or unfavorable toward Bush’s and Gore’s tax cut
proposals. Responses were on a 4-point ordinal scale, from very favorable to very
unfavorable. Respondents to the postdiscussion survey were almost evenly split
between the candidates, with 43% favoring Gore’s tax plan and 44% favoring Bush’s.
About 12% were equally favorable toward both. The two items—evaluations of
Bush’s plan and evaluations of Gore’s plan—were, not surprisingly, negatively correlated (r 2.62, p , .001). Consequently, they were combined into a 7-point index
by subtracting the respondent’s favorability toward Gore’s plan from his or her
favorability toward Bush’s plan. Values ranged from 23 to 13, with higher scores
reflecting preference for the Bush plan and lower scores a preference for Gore’s (M
0.15, SD 1.97).
Opinion expressions in discussion
We recorded the full text of all online discussions and subsequently coded each to
assess viewpoints expressed about the two competing tax proposals. The aim of the
content analysis was to determine (a) the number of merely valenced statements each
participant made about the candidates or their plans (i.e., statements that were
positive or negative in valence, but which did not give any reasons for these feelings)
and (b) the number of arguments each participant made about the tax plans (i.e.,
statements that gave some form of reason for a pro- or con-evaluation of the competing plans). An argument indicated both directionality (pro/con) and provided
a reason, while a merely valenced statement indicated directionality only. The coding
neither capture the potential truth value of an argument nor its complexity; it merely
took account of whether some kind of reason was advanced.
Because the moderators’ prompts asked about the two tax plans, rather than one
at a time, the coding scheme captured four possible facets of the discussants’ arguments: They could be pro-Bush, pro-Gore, con-Bush, or con-Gore. A statement
could contain more than one argument, offer mixed arguments, or advance no
argument at all.
For example, consider the following statements (group number, date, time):

A. (Group 58, 10/07, 21:42): ‘‘As long as we don’t use it all, cut taxes.’’
B. (Group 38, 10/11, 23:48): ‘‘Gore will help the middle class and they seem to be
the ones that get no tax breaks.’’
C. (Group 7, 10/15, 19:43): ‘‘Gore will only cut takes [taxes] for the very poor .
those that don’t realy [really] give any money anyway.’’
D. (Group 43, 10/12, 21:43): ‘‘Gore would keep any surplus and just make more
government programs, Bush would return some to those who paid it.’’
Statement A is a merely positive statement (pro-Bush), without any reasons.
Statement B, on the other hand, is favorable toward Gore and states a reason for
supporting his plan, and hence represents a pro-Gore argument. Similarly, Statement

C states a reason, but this time against Gore’s plan, and therefore constitutes a conGore argument. Finally, Statement D, as it gives reasons both for and against the
respective candidates’ tax proposals, embodies one con-Gore argument and one
pro-Bush argument.
Reliability of the coding was assessed by comparing data from two independent
coders evaluating random subsamples of 200 statements at a time. Inconsistencies
between coders were resolved by discussing the examples with the principal investigators and refining decision rules. For the final coding system, Cohen’s kappa
values for chance-corrected intercoder agreement were generally close to .80, with
assessments of directionality proving to be slightly more reliable (k values between
.77 and .84) than assessments of argumentation (k values between .75 and .78).
Individual Arguments
To measure individual expression of arguments, we aggregated coded statement data
for each individual, yielding four variables: number of pro-Bush arguments, number
of pro-Gore arguments, number of con-Bush arguments, and number of con-Gore
arguments. Pro-arguments for both candidates ranged from 0 to 5, whereas conarguments ranged from 0 to 3. We recoded all four argument counts to reflect
a common direction (pro-Bush) and examined them for dimensionality. A factor
analysis (with varimax rotation) yielded a single factor, explaining 48% of the total
variance, with loadings ranging between .63 and .73. Thus, the four measures were
combined into a single scale, with values ranging from 26 (pro-Gore argumentation)
to 7 (pro-Bush argumentation; Cronbach’s a .63; M 2.20; SD 2.26).
Merely Valenced Statements
Statements that reflected a favorable disposition toward the object of reference (Bush,
Gore, or their respective tax plans) were coded as 11, whereas a statement that
reflected an unfavorable disposition received a value of 21. We constructed a measure
of exclusively valenced statements by subtracting the count of pro-arguments from
the valence sum score and adding the count of con-arguments. Aggregating statements across individuals—counting in this instance only those valenced statements
not containing arguments—produced two variables: average valence toward Gore
and average valence toward Bush. The two measures were not significantly correlated
(r 2.04, p .497, n 288) and therefore were not combined.
Exposure to Group Arguments
For group-level argumentation, we aggregated the sum of individual-level arguments—pro-Bush, pro-Gore, con-Bush, and con-Gore—within each of the 60 discussion groups. Following the aggregation, we subtracted each individual’s
arguments from the group-level number of arguments for each of those four variables. The group-level variables thereby captured the climate of argumentation that
each participant experienced, independent of his or her own contribution to the
discussion.4 A factor analysis (with varimax rotation) of the four aggregated group

counts yielded a single factor, explaining 61% of the total variance, with factor
loadings between .77 and .81. Consequently, we combined the four measures to
form a single scale, with values ranging from 216 (pro-Gore argumentation) to 15
(pro-Bush argumentation; Cronbach’s a .78; M 21.10; SD 7.26).
Exposure to Group Statements of Mere Valence
We computed a group-level measure of merely valenced expressions in a similar
manner. We aggregated statements that expressed directionality but contained no
arguments to the group level, and then subtracted each individual’s own contributions of merely valenced statements from his or her group’s totals. These corrected
group-level sums of valenced statements toward Bush and Gore were not significantly interrelated (r 2.09, p .113, n 288). The group-level valence sums, on
the other hand, were moderately to strongly correlated with group-level argumentation. For example, group-level argumentation (coded as pro-Bush in direction)
was positively related to pro-Bush group valence (r .57, p , .001) and negatively
related to pro-Gore group valence (r 2.30, p , .001).
Controls
Group Size
The number of persons present for 5 minutes or more in the discussion room
constituted our measure of group size, which ranged from 2 to 9 participants, with
a median of 6.
Propensity to Participate in Discussions
Numerous characteristics of individuals might account for whether or not they
participate in online discussions. Although we limited our analysis only to those
who actually attended the October discussions, there is a chance that the variables
of interest here—arguments, expressions of mere opinion, and shifts of opinion—
might be affected in part by factors that lead to online participation in the first
instance. Consequently, we included as a control variable an estimated likelihood
of participating (a propensity score). We generated this measure by calculating
a predicted probability of attending at least one of the online discussions. The
propensity to participate is a multivariate, logistic function of variables such as
age, gender, race, news media exposure, political knowledge, social trust, community participation, employment and family status, and ability to generate arguments in response to a survey question (see Price, Cappella, Tsfati, & StromerGalley, 2001).5
Analytical Procedure
We first investigated the possibility of systematic differences in political knowledge
and education levels by group-heterogeneity condition (liberal, conservative, or
heterogeneous), as these factors, rather than the argumentative climate, might conceivably have accounted for stability or change of opinion. Checks indicated no

significant differences in political knowledge, education, and attendance patterns
across the heterogeneous and politically homogeneous group types. Next, we
examined the postdiscussion opinion means across groups and estimated multivariate ordinary least squares regression models predicting individual expression
and postdiscussion opinion. Finally, we explored several rival explanations for our
findings.
Results
Group-level effects
Table 1 presents a two-way cross-tabulation of postdiscussion opinion, across levels
of group- and individual-level argumentation (categorized as pro-Gore, pro-Bush,
or mixed patterns of argument). The higher the mean score, the more supportive the
postdiscussion opinion was of Bush; the lower the mean score, the more it supported
Gore. Overall, as the bottom row of means makes clear, there was a linear increase in
postdiscussion support for Bush’s tax cut in keeping with group-level argumentation, M 21.23 in groups that argued primarily for Gore, M 11.46 in groups that
argued primarily for Bush; F(2, 251) 51.059, p , .001. The average posttest opinion
score, not surprisingly, was also related to the pattern of individuals’ arguments
during the discussion. The more arguments a person voiced in favor of Gore, for
instance, the lower the average score on the postdiscussion opinion scale. Individual
arguments, however, appear contingent on the arguments made by others in discussion. The more other people in the group argued in favor of one candidate’s tax cut
(recall that the group-level argumentation measure involved subtracting each individual’s contributions), the more participants voiced arguments that were consistent
in that direction.
The pattern of means suggests that group- and individual-level arguments are
related, and also that group-level arguments affect postdiscussion opinions (see,
e.g., the linear increase in the top row of Table 1, which controls for individual
Table 1 Postdiscussion Opinion, by Group Level and Individual Level Argumentation
Individuals
Arguing for.
Gore
Mixed
Bush
Total

Others in the Group Arguing in Favor of a
Gore
1.90 (52)
0.48 (27)
2.50 (4)
1.23 (83)

Mixed
1.44 (16)
0.04 (49)
1.86 (29)
0.31 (94)

Bush
0.71 (7)
0.60 (20)
2.15 (47)
1.46 (74)

Note: Valid N (listwise) = 251. Table entries are means of the postdiscussion opinion index,
with positive values reflecting a preference for Bush’s tax plan and negative values a preference
for Gore’s. Ns given in parentheses.
a
Groups arguing for Gore, Bush, or mixed in their arguments are based upon a tercile split.
Group level values exclude the respondent’s contribution.

argumentation). However, these mean comparisons do not take into account prior
opinion on the tax proposals, which presumably anchors not only postdiscussion
opinion but individual argumentation as well.
Individual expression in discussion
Table 2 presents estimates from a series of multivariate regression analyses predicting each of the three measures of individual opinion expression. Each model includes
as predictors (a) a person’s prediscussion opinion and (b) group-level expression
(counts of what other people in a respondent’s group said and argued). Group size
and propensity to attend online discussions served as controls. The model predicting
individual argumentation explained nearly half of the variance. While prior opinion
was clearly the strongest factor influencing what individuals argued, we found that
others’ behavior in the group also significantly affected individual expression
(group-level argumentation b .15, p , .05). Although the coefficients for merely
valenced statements made by others in the group were in the expected directions,
they were not significantly related to the pattern of arguments individuals expressed.
The remaining columns of Table 2 present estimates from regressions predicting
the expression of merely valenced comments in the discussions (i.e., statements in
favor of one or the other of the candidates that contained no arguments). Two results
are notable in these equations. First, the proportions of variance accounted for by the
Table 2 Predictors of Individual Expression During the Discussion
Argumentsa
B
b
Intercept
Prediscussion opinionb
Pro Bush
Don’t Know
Group level expressionc
Arguments
Mere valence (Pro Bush)
Mere valence (Pro Gore)
Group size
Propensity to attend
R2
N
a

1.75**

Mere Valence
(pro Bush)
B
b
.51†

Mere Valence
(pro Gore)
B
b
.22

3.00***
1.85***

.66
.33

.31**
.06

.20
.03

.16
.07

.09
.03

.05*
.08
.06
.06
.25
.48

.15
.07
.07
.05
.02

.01
.06*
.00
.03
.50
.12

.08
.17
.01
.07
.09

.02
.05
.08***
.01
.28
.09

.13
.12
.21
.01
.04

247

247

247

Arguments coded to reflect positivity toward George Bush or his tax plan.
Pro Bush opinion and don’t know categories each entered in regression equation as dichot
omous dummy variables. Omitted reference category is pro Gore opinion.
c
Group level measures represent aggregations of statements from other group members.
Each individual’s contributions have been subtracted (see text).
†p , .1. *p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001.
b

models were substantially lower, largely due to the much smaller (indeed, in the case
of statements about Gore, nonsignificant) effects of respondents’ prior opinions
about the tax plans. Second, in each case, we found that the valenced comments
of others members of the group affect individual expressions, with respondents’
valenced statements about Bush mirroring the group climate with respect to Bush
(b .17, p , .05) and respondents’ valenced comments about Gore mirroring the
group climate with respect to Gore (b .21, p , .01).
Postdiscussion opinion
Table 3 concerns factors influencing postdiscussion opinion. Model 1 relates to
postdiscussion opinion as a function of prediscussion opinion and group-level
expressions during the discussion, with controls for group size and propensity to
attend online discussions. Overall, the model accounted for 67% of the variance in
opinion, with most of the explained variance, again not surprisingly, attributable to
prior opinion. Initial Bush supporters were much more likely than Gore supporters
to express their approval of Bush’s tax plan on the postdiscussion survey. Similarly,

Table 3 Predictors of Postdiscussion Opinion
Model 1
B
Intercept
Prediscussion opiniona
Pro Bush
Don’t Know
Group level expressionb
Arguments
Mere valence (pro Bush)
Mere valence (pro Gore)
Group size
Propensity
Individual level expression
Arguments
Mere valence (pro Bush)
Mere valence (pro Gore)
R2
N

Model 2
b

1.60***
.82
.29

.03*
.09*
.02
.00
.07

.11
.10
.02
.00
.01

.67

b

1.14**

3.20***
1.35***

221

B

2.21***
.76***

.56
.16

.01
.05
.01
.02
.13

.05
.06
.02
.02
.01

.31***
.21*
.05
.74
221

.36
.09
.02

Note: Dependent variable is a postdiscussion opinion index, with positive values reflecting
a preference for Bush’s tax plan and negative values a preference for Gore’s.
a
Pro Bush opinion and don’t know categories each entered in regression equation as dichot
omous dummy variables. The omitted reference category is thus pro Gore opinion.
b
Group level measures represent aggregations of statements from other group members.
Each individual’s contributions have been subtracted (see text).
†p , .1. *p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001.

those who did not know initially which tax plan they supported were less likely to
support Gore in the postdiscussion survey (compared to Gore supporters, the omitted category in the regression model).
Above and beyond these strong effects of prior opinion, group-level arguments
also predicted postdiscussion opinion. Controlling for respondents’ own initial
opinions, the more the arguments made by other group members in favor of Bush’s
tax cut, the more the respondents tended to prefer that plan in the postdiscussion
survey (b .11, p , .05). In similar vein, the more arguments a respondent heard in
favor of Gore’s plan, the more he or she tended to prefer Gore’s proposal. Estimates
for Model 1 also suggested that merely valenced statements referring to Bush—but not
Gore—could predict postdiscussion opinions bearing on the tax plans (b .10, p ,
.05). In other words, negative and positive comments about Bush voiced by other
people in the discussion are correlated with corresponding preferences for his tax plan.
The results presented thus far suggest that expressions of others in the group
influence individual participants’ statements about the tax plans during the discussion and also predict individual opinion change. Whether individual arguments
mediate the relationship between group-level arguments and opinion change
remains to be tested. Model 2 in Table 3 shows estimates from an equation that
includes our three measures of individual-level expression. R2 increased significantly
over Model 1, with the expanded model accounting for 74% of the variance. Prior
opinion continued to be a strong predictor. The model also shows significant effects
of individual expression (b for argumentation .36, b for merely valenced statements about Bush .09). Notably, the previously estimated effects of group-level
expression were considerably attenuated and no longer significant.
Discussion

Taken together, the regression models presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that
(a) the expressions of group members—both arguments and merely valenced
statements—predict patterns of individual expression and (b) individual expression
contributes significantly to postdiscussion opinion change. Our results thus suggest
that the argumentative ‘‘climate’’ of group opinion affected postdiscussion opinion
change indirectly, by shaping the character of individual participants’ own expressed
opinions and arguments during the online deliberations. There appears to be a process of collective elicitation of arguments and mere opinion statements (perhaps
a form of group ‘‘contagion’’), in which individuals’ behaviors mimic the general
tenor of the group. Such behaviors—particularly the arguments each individual
made—then contributed to individual shifts of opinion. Overall, there appears to
be less consistency with the group tenor in the mere expression of opinion—making
statements favorable or unfavorable about the candidates or their plans—than in the
making of arguments.
These findings indicate clear social influence, although not the kind of majoritypressure processes posited by the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). There is

no indication in these data of any silencing effect; rather, the influence appears to be
operating via a positive elicitation of arguments. In this respect, the effects on
individual opinions appear to be informational in nature, and the ‘‘persuasive
arguments’’ explanation of group influence (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977) thus
appears a better fit with the data. This model seems consistent with our findings
and cannot be ruled out, yet it fails to explain one important aspect of the results.
Were exposure to others’ arguments the operative mechanism of persuasion, ‘‘hearing’’ them expressed by others should have proven sufficient to generate shifts in
individual opinion. Yet, changes in opinion appeared to have been mediated entirely
by participants’ own arguments. There is nothing in the ‘‘persuasive arguments’’
model that would predict such an outcome. Consequently, it remains a viable but
only partial explanation for the results.
The pattern of results does appear broadly consistent with the notion that individuals may have accommodated their behavior to perceived group norms, as proposed by social identity theory (Postmes et al., 2005). According to this line of
thinking, our participants gathered from observing others the emerging behavioral
norms of the group, and under the influence of a highly salient identity as a group
member adopted these perceived norms. This is a highly interactive process, in the
sense that individual members themselves contribute to the shared norms by which
they are in turn influenced. Importantly, the social identity model does account for
the significant role of each person’s own behavior in mediating the influence of
collective group patterns of opinion expression and argumentation.
While the data are consistent with the social identity model, there do remain
other possible explanations. The interactive process of argument elicitation we
observed, for example, could have resulted from cognitive priming mechanisms
(i.e., expressed thoughts stimulating retrieval of related thoughts). It may conceivably have been less a product of individual accommodation to a group prototype
than the result of a collective, interactive knowledge activation effect. Instead of
imparting new information, arguments expressed in the group may direct attention
to certain aspects of an issue, heightening the likelihood that other members will
render those salient beliefs and considerations applicable to the issue at hand (see
Higgins, 1996) and thus indirectly shaping subsequent expressions. In the group
context, the relevant knowledge store is a collective fund of ideas held by assembled
group members—what psychologists have termed a transactive memory system (e.g.,
Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1995)—and the spreading activation of constructs
across the group takes place not only psychologically but also interpersonally,
through discussion (see also recent research in organizational behavior on ‘‘shared
cognition’’ and ‘‘team mental models,’’ e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001;
Mohammed & Dumville, 2001).
Limitations and alternative interpretations
Overall, our results lend credence to the proposition that group arguments and
opinions influence the statements individuals make and so indirectly shape their

opinions. Still, we acknowledge several alternative interpretations. First, the ‘‘group
effect’’ we found on argumentation may have been an artifact of the design. The
ideologically homogeneous groups, conservative and liberal, outnumbered the
heterogeneous groups by a ratio of 2:1. Consequently, people who participated in
our discussions were twice as likely to talk with like-minded people as with people
taking an opposing point of view. If aggregate-level opinion virtually mirrors individual opinions in highly homogeneous groups, this fact may explain in part the
group-level ‘‘effect’’ observed here. However, follow-up analysis suggests this was not
at all likely to have been the case. Models similar to those presented above but
including dummy variables to capture differences in group heterogeneity indicated
that the estimated group-level effects held for both heterogeneous and homogeneous
groups alike.
Second, although we included controls for prior opinion (which accounted for
large proportions of variance in our dependent variables), it may nonetheless have
been the case that some other unmeasured variable, such as a generic candidate
preference, explains the apparent effects of group-level argumentation and opinion
expression. It could be, for example, that respondents’ general dispositions toward
Bush or Gore account both for their behavior observed during the discussion and their
postdiscussion opinions. Again, follow-up analyses suggested this was not the case.
The regression models presented above were reestimated after adding an additional
covariate, a combined measure ranging from 2100 strong preference for Gore to
1100 strong preference for Bush (formed by subtracting a 100-point ‘‘feeling thermometer’’ rating of Gore from a similar measure of feelings toward Bush). While
thermometer ratings accounted for a substantial proportion of the variance in individual statements during the discussions and in postdiscussion opinion, adding this
additional control did not appreciably affect the estimates presented above.
A third possibility is that our results could simply reflect consistency. Those
who were initially favorable toward Bush, this argument goes, would also have
argued for his tax cut during the discussion and perhaps became even more convinced of that initial position as a result. Hence, our data reflect polarization of initial
inclinations.
To some extent, this line of argument rings true: witness the large effects of prior
opinion in our estimated models. But what of those who, on the preevent survey,
indicated no preference either way? How were they affected, if at all, by the group
climate of opinion and argument? Additional analyses involving only those respondents who had no preference on the prediscussion survey (n 55) indicated that these
respondents were indeed influenced by the arguments and opinions expressed by
other members of their groups. Figure 1, which plots postdiscussion opinion by prior
opinion and group-level arguments, illustrates the pattern. The top three bars in the
figure represent the postdiscussion opinion means for those who initially favored Gore
(white bar) or Bush (gray bar) or who were undecided (black bar), and who were in
groups where others argued for Gore’s plan. The second and third clusters represent
groups that were mixed in their arguments or that argued for Bush’s tax plan.

Bush (n = 107)

DK(n= 52)

Gore (n= 77)

Gore

Mixed

Bush

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

Post Opinion Means (Gore = 3, Bush = 3)

Figure 1 Postdiscussion opinion by prior opinion and group level argumentation.
Note: Means plotted are on a scale running from 3 = prefers Gore tax plan to 13 = prefers
Bush tax plan. Different shadings indicate the respondent’s preference before the discussion.
The right hand labels denote the overall direction of arguments that were voiced by other
participants during the online discussions (not including the plotted respondents).

Focusing first on those who were initially decided (the white bars for Gore
supporters and the gray bars for Bush supporters), we see a dominant pattern of
continued support for their initial preference (though the postopinion means
do show a linear trend in keeping with the dominant character of group argumentation). Meanwhile, and critically given our present concerns, those who were initially undecided (the black bars) clearly moved toward the side supported by others
in their groups. The ‘‘undecideds’’ in groups arguing for Gore moved toward support
for Gore, whereas those in groups arguing for Bush moved toward Bush.
Thus, the results of our analysis suggest that the argumentative ‘‘climate’’ of
group opinion indeed affected postdiscussion opinion. A primary mechanism
responsible for this effect appears to be an intermediate influence on individual
participants’ own expressed opinions and arguments during the online discussions.
For those respondents who entered the debate supporting one or the other of the
tax plans, this effect may have consolidated or magnified a preexisting preference.
For those entering the discussions not knowing quite where they stood on the two tax
plans, this effect appears to have moved these uncommitted respondents into one or
another of the two opinion camps, depending on the tenor of group argumentation.
This analysis applies only to online discussions about a single issue that were of
relatively brief duration. These were also experimentally constructed groups that
may have differed in unknown ways from naturally occurring online groups (e.g.,
UseNet or Yahoo! Chat groups). It remains for future research to reveal whether the
processes observed here can be generalized to other issues and discussion situations.
Nevertheless, these findings represent an important step forward in research on the

normative and informational influences of group discussion on the formation of
individual opinion. We have begun to gain insight into group influences on
a person’s actual expressive behavior while in a group setting, alongside that person’s
opinions and preferences, as indicated on confidential pre- and postdiscussion questionnaires. This unusually detailed collection of measures has produced a suggestive
image: It appears that collective group environments elicit from members arguments
and mere opinion statements that reflect the general trend of the group, and that
these elicited behaviors—particularly arguments made—subsequently influence
postdiscussion opinions. Note that, absent the interaction data, we still would have
been able to document that groups had influenced personal opinions. But the fact
that this influence was mediated nearly entirely by the sorts of statements people
themselves contributed would have remained unknown.
The fact that arguments beget arguments can be viewed normatively, with respect
to public opinion formation and political deliberation, as a positive outcome.
Although our groups did not need to debate to any consensus, a norm of reasoned
interaction appeared to have emerged, even in group settings where it might have
been sufficient simply to agree. Yet, as shown in Table 2, we also found that arguments clearly called forth additional arguments. At the same time, however, the
group climate of group argumentation also had a directional influence on individual’s expressed reasons, indirectly producing the modest polarizing pattern in postdiscussion opinions apparent in Figure 1.
In general, these findings underscore the subtle but significant effects of group
discussion on individual participants. They also testify elegantly, we believe, to the
considerable value of comprehensive theoretical and empirical accounts, not only of
basic group inputs and outputs but of group structure and communicative interactions as well.
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Notes
1 The fact that social identity theory explains how social influence can operate indirectly
has also rendered it quite useful in mass media research, for example in explaining how
news reports of group conflict can subtly but significantly shape audience opinions
(Anastasio, Rose, & Chapman, 2005; Price, 1988, 1989).

2 This research suggests that groups debating ‘‘intellective’’ issues (Laughlin, 1980),
which involve ascertaining a demonstrably correct answer to a problem, generate more
information based arguments than do groups deciding on ‘‘judgmental’’ issues, for
which demonstrably correct solutions are less clear and where answers are sought on
moral, ethical, or other value based grounds (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).
3 Participation rates in this case were typical. Generally, 30 40% of eligible participants
attended most discussion events. Over the course of the project, just over 70% of eligible
participants in the discussion group attended at least one online event, while about 40%
attended four or more events (see Appendix).
4 It should be noted that the group level variables differ for individuals within each group,
rather than remain constant within groups. The multivariate models we present con
sequently estimate standard errors for the group climate measures based on individual
cases rather than on 60 groups.
5 Potential confounders included in the estimation of propensity scores were identified
with the guidance of prior research on political participation, which has identified
a number of motivational variables, opportunity related factors, and resources that
generally predict civic engagement (e.g., Brady, 1999; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995).
Variables used to calculate the propensity score were: age, gender, race, education level,
income, interest in politics, political knowledge, church attendance, media exposure,
political discussion, party strength, political participation, full time employment,
number of children, full time student status, and a measure of a respondent’s ability to
generate arguments in response to open ended survey questions ("argument repertoire,"
described in Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002).
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Appendix: Sampling and study design
Initial recruitment
The project recruited study participants from a survey panel maintained by Knowledge Networks, Inc., of Menlo Park, California. The panel includes a large number of
households (in the tens of thousands) that have agreed to accept free WebTV equipment and service in exchange for completing periodic surveys online. The Knowledge Networks Panel Sample begins with a list-assisted RDD sample provided by
a Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI). Samples are acquired approximately once a month to
ensure that they are drawn from up-to-date databases. Numbers in the SSI sample
are then matched against a database of numbers known to be in the WebTV network.
These numbers are then contacted, and households are asked to participate as members of the Knowledge Network panel. In exchange for completing surveys (approximately 40 minutes of cumulative survey time per household per month), panelists
receive WebTV equipment and access free of charge. The recruitment process results
in a response rate of approximately 55–60%. It produces a sample of American
households that closely approximates the population at large, with a very slight
underrepresentation of minorities and the elderly (Knowledge Networks, 2000).
In February 2000, a random sample of American citizens aged 18 and older (N
3967) was drawn from the panel. The aim of the initial sample survey was to recruit
participants into three groups for the Electronic Dialogue project: first, a main group
of people who would participate in monthly, hour-long moderated discussions
about the presidential election in small groups (target n 900); second, a control
group of people who would complete all monthly surveys associated with the project
but would not engage in online discussions (target n 100); and a third group of
people who would complete only the project’s initial baseline surveys in February
and March 2000 and the final, postproject surveys 1 year later (target n 500). The
third group was intended as a control for panel effects, and also as a potential ‘‘setaside’’ pool of new recruits for use should attrition necessitate additions to either of
the two panel groups. All members of the main discussion panel and the survey-only
control panel were released from all obligations to complete other surveys for

Knowledge Networks, aside from those issued as part of the Electronic Dialogue
project. Assignment to the three groups (main discussion panel, survey-only control
panel, and pre/post-only ‘‘set-aside’’ group) was randomized.
Overall, 51% of those recruited agreed to participate and completed consent
forms, with overall acceptance rates roughly similar across the three groups of
respondents. The final number of recruited project participants was 2014. Of these,
1076 were assigned to the main discussion panel, 168 to the survey-only control
panel, and the remainder to the project pre/post-only group. Analysis of group
characteristics (demographics, age, race, gender, political interest, ideology, and
party leanings) confirmed that the randomization was successful.
The baseline surveys
Two baseline surveys were conducted, the first from February 8 to March 10, and the
second from March 10 to 23. All three groups (discussion, survey-only control, and
set-aside) were contacted. The surveys included extensive measures of media use,
interest in the presidential campaign, general political knowledge and knowledge of
the campaign, political discussion, and a wide variety of political attitudes and
opinions. A total of 1801 respondents completed the first baseline (89%), and
1743 completed the second (87%). Both baselines were completed by 1684 respondents, or 84% of those who completed consent forms. Cooperation rates were generally similar across the three main groups.
Characteristics of the obtained baseline sample were compared with those from
a random-digit dial telephone survey conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy
Center during the same days the Electronic Dialogue baseline surveys were in the
field (contact rate was 54%; cooperation rate, 57%; eligibility rate, 92%; and final
response rate, 30%). In general, the samples are rather similar; however, the final
baseline and discussion group samples for Electronic Dialogue tend to slightly
overrepresent males, and to underrepresent those with less than a high school education, nonwhites, and, especially, those who have low levels of interest in politics.
This is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that participants agreed to join
a yearlong project associated with the presidential election campaign—a substantially
greater commitment than that generally associated with completing surveys (for
more details, see Price & Cappella, 2002).
Organization of the small-group discussions
Beginning in April, participants in the main discussion group were invited to attend
small-group discussions (i.e., 5–10 person), one per month. The intention was to
maintain consistent group membership over the course of the campaign. Anticipating far less than perfect attendance, and in order to ensure adequate group size,
a total of 60 groups were formed, with roughly 15 participants per group. Because
groups were to meet live, in real time, with membership straddling several time
zones, a complete listing of participant availability (in the afternoons and evenings,
7 days a week) and rank-ordered preference for meeting times was obtained from all

respondents. Analysis of these data suggested that 16 timeslots would accommodate
over 60% of participants’ first choices of meeting times and would meet virtually all
availabilities (though for many participants not a top choice). Participants were
offered these 16 possible timeslots and were requested to choose all timeslots for
which they would be available. Final groups, 60 in all, were then constituted.
Because of the theoretical interest in the impact of disagreement, composition of
the discussion groups was manipulated in order to ensure variance in levels of
political agreement and opposition. Specifically, three experimental conditions were
created: homogeneously liberal groups (n 20), homogeneously conservative groups
(n 20), and heterogeneous groups consisted of members from across the political
spectrum (n 20). For this purpose, a 7-point party identification scale and a 5point political ideology scale were combined into a single index, which ranged from
25 (strong Republicans/very conservative) through 0 (independents/moderates/other
centrists) to 15 (strong Democrats/very liberal). Conservative groups were drawn
from the lower end of this continuum (the 20 groups averaged 23.09 on the index,
with an SD of 1.6), the liberal groups from the upper end (the 20 groups averaged
2.53 with an SD of 1.58), and heterogeneous groups from the entire continuum (the
20 groups averaged 2.33 with an SD of 3.5, more than twice as large as the SD across
homogeneous groups).
The discussion events
Most monthly discussion ‘‘events’’ consisted of three parts: a prediscussion survey,
online discussion, and a follow-up postdiscussion survey. Participants in the main
discussion panel (n 915) were asked to do all three parts, whereas those in the
control panel (n 139) completed only the survey portions.
Participants logged on to their ‘‘discussion rooms’’ at prearranged times, using
their WebTV devices, television sets, and infrared keyboards. The full TV screen was
used. Participants typed their comments and, when they hit the ‘‘enter’’ key on their
keyboards, would post these comments to all other group members present in the
room. All discussions were moderated by project assistants and were carefully coordinated and scripted to maintain consistency across groups. Prompts and questions
were ‘‘dropped’’ by moderators into the discussions at prearranged times. The full
text of all discussions, including time stamps for each comment, was automatically
recorded. Discussions were lively and engaging, and participants contributed on
average between 200 and 300 words per event.
The first event, with discussions held in mid-April, focused on getting acquainted
and identifying issues of main concern to participants. The second, held in mid-May,
focused on educational issues, and the third event, in mid-June, dealt with issues of
crime and public safety. The fourth, held at the end of July and in early August,
centered around participants’ views of campaigning. The main campaign season
involved three further discussions. Right after Labor Day in September, groups
viewed and then talked about advertisements from each campaign. Following the
first presidential and vice presidential debates in October, groups discussed the

candidates’ stands on health care and taxes, and how effective they thought each
campaign had been to that point. In the week prior to the election, groups talked
about a variety of other issues that had surfaced during the campaign. With the
election results still in doubt, groups met again in early December to discuss the
electoral process, how each candidate and the press were handling the disputes over
the election, and the role of the Electoral College.
Given the prediscussion and postdiscussion surveys every month, the project
amounted to a 28-wave panel study for the discussion group, and a 19-wave panel
study for the survey-only control group. Given this extraordinary level of burden, it
is not surprising that cooperation rates were far from perfect. However, the majority
of study participants did complete most surveys. Survey cooperation rates were
generally similar for both the discussion and control groups, hovering at around
70% early in the project and declining over the course of time to about 60% at the
project’s end.
By far the most demanding elements of the project were the online discussions
themselves. Rates of participation in these discussions ranged from about 40% at the
outset and declined to roughly 30% toward the end, producing groups that averaged
between 5 and 6 participants each. There was a fair degree of turnover in attendance
from one event to the next. By the end of the eighth event in December, over 70% of
the discussion group (663 respondents) had attended at least one of the online
discussions, and roughly 40% (or 350) had attended half or more of the events.
End of project surveys
In January, two end-of-project surveys were conducted. The first was fielded from
January 4 to 18, and the second from January 19 to February 1. These surveys again
included extensive measures of media use, participation in the presidential campaign, and discussion behavior over the course of the campaign and in its aftermath,
and a wide variety of political attitudes and opinions. All three original study groups
surveyed during the project baseline (those invited to discussions, the survey-only
control group, and the set-asides) were contacted for reinterview at this time. Fiftyfive percent completed the first survey, and 56% completed the second.

